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Streamlining the Roadshow: The Distribution and Exhibition of Gone with the Wind 
 
“Is my face Scarlett?” said the MGM salesman, as he started to discuss 
terms on Gone With The Wind. 
    “We showed him the road,” said the exhibitor, describing the incident 
later. “So they road-showed.” 
    (Demands for apologies from outraged film travellers will be dealt 
with in strict rotation.)1 
 
    David O. Selznick’s production of Gone with the Wind (1939) is often taken to 
be the culmination of “classical” Hollywood in the 1930s, though in most respects it 
is an exception to all of its norms and standards. With a running time of 222 
minutes (not including intermission) and a negative cost of over $4 million, it was 
the longest and most expensive American film yet made.2 It was adapted from the 
hottest literary property of the decade, Margaret Mitchell’s best-selling novel of the 
Old South. It had the largest amount of pre-release (and indeed pre-production) 
publicity accorded any film to date, and was therefore quite reasonably described 
as the picture most eagerly awaited by the public. And once exhibited, it quickly 
broke all records for box-office performance, setting new benchmarks for possible 
admissions and grosses. Gone with the Wind had certainly been expected to be a 
success; but the scale of that success took everyone, including its producer, by 
surprise.  
    Nevertheless, both Selznick and MGM (which had invested $1,250,000 of the 
film’s budget and loaned its contract star Clark Gable in exchange for the 
distribution rights and 50 per cent of the profits) had made every attempt to 
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guarantee the film’s profitability in advance and to make it an “event” (Selznick’s 
term). The story of the production of Gone with the Wind has been told many 
times, perhaps more often than that of any other film.3 What have less often been 
discussed are the distribution and exhibition methods used to bring it to audiences. 
They were not only significantly different from any preceding roadshow attraction; 
they effectively changed both the practice and the very definition of roadshowing, 
setting the pattern for big-picture releases from the early 1940s to the mid-1950s. 
     As a practice, roadshowing -- the touring of plays and shows -- was rooted in 
the legitimate theater and other forms of live entertainment. The itinerant exhibition 
of films in the 1890s and 1900s was an extension of this practice, one that 
continued on a small scale for many decades. But roadshowing on a large scale, 
in a manner reminiscent of the major repertory companies in the legitimate 
commercial theater, came to be used in the 1910s as a means of distributing and 
exhibiting early feature-length films and major attractions designated as “specials” 
or “superspecials”. At a time when the film industry in the US was dominated by 
the production, distribution, and exhibition of programs of shorter films, when the 
seating capacity of most of the venues used for exhibiting films was limited, and 
when most programs lasted little more than an hour and were changed at least 
two or three times a week, the roadshowing of longer features in large theatrical 
venues for weeks and months rather than days was a means not only of 
showcasing expensive prestige productions, but also of building individualized 
publicity campaigns and attracting audiences willing and able to pay 
higher-than-average seat prices in numbers large enough to cover costs and 
generate profits. Many of the earliest films shown in this way in the United States 
were imported from Europe. Among the earliest were Quo Vadis? (1913) and 
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Cabiria (1914), Italian productions that broke new ground in terms of length, 
lavishness, prestige, and box-office earnings. In the United States, D.W. Griffith 
and Cecil B. DeMille sought to emulate films like these. Griffith produced and 
directed The Birth of a Nation (1915) and Intolerance (1916), DeMille, Joan the 
Woman (1916). All three were roadshown nationwide. As well as being the longest 
and most expensive American film to date, The Birth of a Nation was a huge 
box-office success. Exhibited in a legitimate theater on Broadway for a top ticket 
price of $2 (when the standard cinema admission price was a nickel or two), it 
helped pave for the way for subsequent large-scale domestic productions shown 
on a similar basis.    
     At a time when most films were presented in continuous performances, without 
breaks between showings, and when tickets were rarely sold or reserved in 
advance, seats for roadshows were bookable, the films themselves were shown at 
specified times (usually twice a day) with at least one intermission, and if “silent,” 
as was of course nearly always the case until the late 1920s, accompanied by a 
specially composed score played by an orchestra. Roadshow runs of this kind 
continued for weeks, months, or sometimes years before versions of the films 
(often re-edited to shorten their running times) were released to regular movie 
theaters and shown in the usual manner at regular prices. Some of the films 
exhibited in this way, such as The Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (1921), The 
Ten Commandments (1923), The Big Parade (1925), and Ben-Hur (1925), earned 
record sums of money.  
     With the introduction of pre-recorded, synchronized sound at the end of the 
1920s, the meaning of roadshowing began to change. It was no longer necessary 
for a live company comprising managers, a stage crew, and an orchestra to 
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accompany each print of a film “on the road” as it traveled from one city to the 
next. But the term, though separated from its literal origins, remained in use to 
describe those elements of legitimate theater presentation retained in the 
exhibition of certain pictures even in dedicated cinemas, such as reserved seats, 
separate performances, in some instances an orchestral overture played before 
the start of the film, an intermission, and the availability of lavishly illustrated 
souvenir program booklets. Raised prices, higher than for regular first-run 
exhibition, were still charged for such films and to encourage mass attendance 
party bookings were sought for the block sale of tickets. Extended engagements 
ran for as long as the box-office would stand, or even longer in the case of 
bookings which had been made for a fixed period of time for publicity purposes. 
Roadshowing a film in a large “pre-release” cinema, especially one on Broadway 
or in Los Angeles and other key cities, served to advertise it both to the general 
public and to other exhibitors prior to its general release at regular prices. Because 
of the greater investment in publicity and additional theater staff, roadshowing was 
inherently more risky than conventional presentation. The films exhibited on such 
a basis therefore had to be chosen carefully both for their prestige value and their 
audience appeal in order to justify their special status. In the 1930s these were 
rather more sporadic than in the silent era, but they included Grand Hotel (1932), 
Dinner at Eight (1933), A Midsummer Night’s Dream (1935), The Great Ziegfeld 
(1936), The Life of Emile Zola (1937), and Lost Horizon (1937). 
    Although it had been widely expected that Gone with the Wind would be 
roadshown in the traditional manner, MGM -- stung by the poor domestic showing 
of its most recent roadshow pictures, The Great Waltz (1938) and Marie Antoinette 
(1938) -- instead wanted to put it into immediate general release in order to get a 
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quicker return on its investment. In a memo addressed (though not sent) to MGM 
Vice President Al Lichtman, Selznick strongly objected to the company’s 
distribution plans, arguing that it would be “as wrong not to road show Gone with 
the Wind as it would have been not to road show The Birth of Nation:” 
It is inconceivable that the American public, which was willing to pay 
road-show prices at that time, is not willing to pay them now. The 
failure, or the mild success, of dozens of other road shows is no 
criterion. There were dozens of road-show failures at the time of Ben-
Hur and The Big Parade. Clearly the pictures did not warrant road 
showing.4 
Selznick pointed out that, even if it were shown in continuous performances, the 
length of Gone with the Wind precluded more than three shows a day “unless the 
first performance is held for night watchmen,” and that the probable “speed of 
revenue” of three daily performances rather than two “might be a few months’ 
difference at the most.” He even had to argue for the necessity of an intermission 
in what would be a four-hour show, as well as for separate performances and 
reserved seats (as seats could be stolen by latecomers if patrons were forced to 
make unscheduled visits to the lavatory).  
    To arrive at the most appropriate release strategy for the film, MGM instituted a 
public survey by distributing questionnaires at previews, asking patrons what 
performance times, ticket price scales and other arrangements they would find 
most suitable and acceptable.5 Questions included the following: 
(1) Did you think the picture should be played? 
- with no intermission? 
- with two intermissions? 
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- with one intermission? 
(2) What, for you, would be the most convenient time of day to start the 
picture, both for matinee and evening performances? In answering 
this question, please bear in mind that the picture with no 
intermission will be four hours long. 
(3) Do you think the picture should be played with continuous 
performances all day, or only at specified times as is the case with 
a play? 
(4) Would you prefer to buy reserved seats? 
(5) What scale of admission prices do you think should be charged? 
And would you be prepared to pay a higher price if the producers 
went to the expense of having only two or three shows a day, with 
reserved seats? 
(6) Will you come to see the picture again? 
    Rather than commit to a definite, uniform nationwide exhibition policy from the 
outset, MGM chose instead to treat the film’s opening engagements as test runs, 
with several different policies operating simultaneously across the country. Ten 
theaters in seven cities were selected for this experiment following the world 
premiere in Atlanta, Georgia, on 15 December 1939. The policies at these venues, 
all of which charged increased admission prices, were as follows: two separate 
shows daily, all seats reserved (Astor, New York; Carthay Circle, Los Angeles; 
Colonial, Reading, Pa.); two separate shows daily, matinee seats unreserved, 
evening seats reserved (State, Boston); three continuous shows daily, no seats 
reserved (Loew’s Grand, Atlanta; United Artists, Los Angeles; Orpheum, Boston; 
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Capitol, Cincinnati; Loew’s, Harrisburg, Pa.); and three continuous shows daily, 
some loge seats reserved (Capitol, New York).6 
    From these early engagements a standard policy was evolved of two 
continuous matinee performances, without reserved seats, and a separate 
evening performance with a limited number of seats reserved. Ticket prices were 
set at a minimum of 75 cents for matinees and $1.10 for evenings, with up to 
$1.65 for “preferred” seats or up to $2.20 for reserved seats (these were the top 
prices charged on Broadway at the Capitol and the Astor, respectively). According 
to Rudy Behlmer, “Reserved seating was optional, but MGM demanded that a 
thirty-minute lapse of time be provided between each showing.”7 Traditional 
roadshow engagements (twice-daily separate performances with all seats 
reserved) were usually offered only when the picture opened on concurrent runs at 
two or more theaters in a community, as with those in New York, Los Angeles, and 
Boston (and later in Detroit and Chicago). In such situations, one theater would 
play on “grind,” the other as a roadshow, thus offering prospective patrons a 
choice. The price differential, by which theaters operating on a roadshow basis 
charged more than those on grind, was justified by the additional convenience to 
patrons of guaranteed seating and advance booking (up to eight weeks ahead in 
the case of the Astor).  
    Such an experimental approach was regarded by Variety’s John C. Flinn as 
“more than a violation of precedent: it is a theatre-man’s nightmare. It is also the 
riskiest piece of showmanship in memory, with little to win and much to lose.” He 
pointed out that the film’s length alone (the duration of an airplane flight from New 
York to Chicago) set a challenge for both exhibitors and audiences: “It will require 
more sitting through than the longest double bill program, with news, cartoon, 
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travelog and screeno combined. From the posterior angle it is a six-day bike 
race.”8 Selznick himself felt that too many concessions had been made and that 
the standard admission prices, higher than the norm for regular engagements but 
lower than those usually charged for roadshows, undersold the picture and 
reduced its prestige value. As he wrote in his undelivered memo to Lichtman: 
You will recall that you laughed at the incident I reported to you of the 
woman who said she had been saving her money to pay $1.65 to see 
Gone with the Wind, and to pay $1.10 per seat for the members of her 
family for “second-best seats;” but who, upon hearing that she would be 
able to buy the best seats, unreserved, for $1.10, said that she certainly 
would not do this, and if that was to be the price of the best tickets, 
obviously the picture wasn’t what it was cracked up to be, and would 
soon be playing at lesser prices, and she would wait until it got to the 
neighborhood houses at the regular price. Since then, I have had 
occasion to cross-examine a number of other people in the middle-class 
and lower-middle-class brackets. The reaction has in each case been 
identical, and has, in addition, been one of great disappointment that an 
event which they had looked forward to for so long was evaporating ... I 
believe there are countless thousands of people who will be enraged at 
being gouged for advanced prices to stand in line, to take their chances 
at seeing the picture partially, to see the picture in discomfort -- but who 
would storm the box-offices to pay $1.65 to be sure of a seat, and to 
see it under the proper circumstances. 
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Nevertheless, the “streamlined” roadshow policy used for Gone with the Wind 
proved enormously successful and established a new set of norms for subsequent 
films to follow. 
    If Selznick was unable to dictate distribution and exhibition policy, he was 
nonetheless determined to exercise some quality control over the standards of 
presentation in theaters. His company prepared a nine-page booklet for circulation 
to house managers (“the link between the producers and the public”), containing 
detailed instructions on how to present the picture “in the perfect form in which the 
public demands to see it.”9 A personally signed memo from the producer began: 
No time, effort, or money has been spared to make Gone with the Wind 
as perfect as possible. We have fully realized our obligation to the 
countless millions of readers of Miss Mitchell’s beloved work, and have 
gone to elaborate pains with every detail of production. 
    This picture represents the very finest obtainable in technical 
equipment, including a new, greatly improved Technicolor, and the use 
of many new devices designed to improve photography and sound 
effects. 
    But all of the time, money and effort, and all of the new devices, will 
have been in vain if we do not have the complete cooperation of the 
exhibitor, without whose showmanship and presentation abilities a 
perfect show is impossible. 
Among the recommendations contained in the booklet was that “no light, 
especially colored light, is projected onto the screen, screen masking or stage 
proscenium during the showing of the picture” (italics in original), and ensuring that 
all house lights were fully extinguished so as not to “throw the color values of the 
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picture off balance.” Projectionists were instructed to check that projector sound 
and light levels were constant, to avoid shifts in volume or color temperature 
following reel changes, and to ensure that the machines themselves were kept 
spotlessly clean to avoid print damage. Ushers were to be “cautioned not to draw 
the aisle curtains, or open the aisle doors, any more often than absolutely 
necessary during the showing of the film,” to ensure that curtains and doors were 
properly closed before the picture start and not opened again until after the 
intermission and end titles had appeared, and to avoid unnecessary movements in 
the aisles or anything which might distract the audience’s attention from the 
screen. Souvenir programs were to be handed to patrons as they entered the 
auditorium, but not when they were seated. A staff rehearsal of the full show, to 
ensure smooth running of the performance, was suggested prior to opening the 
film to the public.  
    Perhaps most important were the instructions regarding the two-and-a-half-
minute overture at the beginning of the first reel, the four-minute intermission 
music following the conclusion of the first part of the picture, the ninety-second 
overture prior to the second part, and the four-minute exit music following the end 
title. All these pieces of atmospheric music -- recorded on the film soundtrack over 
black leader and “designed to establish a mood for the enjoyment of the film,” as 
well as to obviate any choice of inappropriate music by theater management -- 
were to be played over closed curtains, with no light or other images projected on 
the screen.10 The house lights were to be gradually dimmed during the overtures 
before the curtains parted for the picture start (following a seven-second drum 
roll), and lights were to be raised during the entr’acte and exit music only after the 
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curtains had fully closed. Exact timings for each piece allowed the operation of the 
screen curtains and house lights to be precisely synchronized: 
Care should be exercised that a slow drawing of the curtains should not 
commence until “The End” is fully on the screen, as this title comes over 
a dramatically important pictorial effect. There is a cue mark 12 feet 
ahead of the Fade Out of the End title. The curtains should not start to 
close until 5 seconds after this mark has appeared on the screen.  
Gone with the Wind was far from the first film to incorporate additional music in 
this way, but the care and attention it required of theaters to ensure excellence 
and uniformity of presentation set the standard for future roadshow pictures.  
    Exhibitors themselves often resented having admission prices dictated to them 
(a practice later declared illegal) and balked at MGM’s 70 per cent rental 
demands, leading a number of non-affiliated theater chains in cities such as 
Chicago and Minneapolis to refuse to book the picture on first run.11 This opened 
the way for independent exhibitors to step in and book it instead. For its first wave 
of release, the picture was exhibited “only in cities of 100,000 persons and up [of 
which there were 92 in the US], and in theaters seating at least 850.”12 
Advertisements announced that it would “never be played anywhere except at 
advanced prices -- at least until 1941.” MGM charged exhibitors a rental of 70 per 
cent from the first dollar (i.e., before deduction of operating costs), but guaranteed 
them a profit of at least 10 per cent of the gross on the whole run: in the event of 
admissions falling short of expectations, the distributor would make up the 
difference.13  
    To speed up distribution, MGM again broke with precedent by permitting 
“nabes” (neighborhood theatres) to play the film concurrently with downtown 
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situations. For example, Gone with the Wind opened in Brooklyn, Newark, and 
Jersey City in early 1940, while the twin Broadway engagements were still in 
progress; normally they would have had to wait out at least one week’s clearance 
following the termination of the Astor and Capitol runs. However, the distributor 
was keen to maintain the picture’s momentum with as many simultaneous 
bookings as the market would stand. It was estimated that this policy would allow it 
to gross around $500,000 a week. After only five weeks and 209 playdates, box-
office estimates were revised upwards to $1 million a week and an ultimate world 
rental of $20 million was anticipated. First predictions had been for a mere $13 
million -- a sum which had almost been reached domestically by July 1940, when 
Selznick reported a rental to date of $12,402,463, already a industry record.14  
    350 Technicolor prints had been struck at a cost of $1,250 each for a total of 
$437,500; MGM expected that wear and tear from long runs would require the 
entire inventory to be replaced.15 Variety also reported wear and tear on theaters 
themselves: “Nervous breakdowns, enforced vacations for managers and other 
members of house staffs, broken ribs among ushers, heavy toll upon rest-rooms, 
complaints from cleaners and no end of relief for cops who have had to handle 
unprecedented crowds, lie in the wake of sustained engagements of ‘Gone With 
the Wind.’”16 Extended bookings led to other film releases being delayed or having 
to be diverted elsewhere. On Broadway, where the Capitol was Loew’s regular 
pre-release house and the Astor was kept on long-term lease by MGM as a “run” 
house for special engagements, the studio’s new pictures now went instead to 
other showcases such as Radio City Music Hall or the normally second-run Loew’s 
State. But rather than cutting into the business for rival pictures, Gone with the 
Wind was claimed to have the opposite effect, boosting them by stimulating public 
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interest in movie-going generally.17 The Capitol engagement was eventually cut 
short after twelve weeks (still a record long run for the theater) to free it up for new 
product, while the Astor run continued for a total of forty-four weeks, concurrent 
with neighborhood engagements around Greater New York. According to Variety, 
“Never in the history of the business has a picture continued on a roadshow basis 
after the same film has played first, second and third runs in the immediate 
territory.”18  
    Following the advanced-price playoff in 1940, the popular-price general release 
was announced for January 1941, and was preceded by a further set of eight test 
engagements to determine policy. MGM’s plan to book the film into many of the 
same theaters which had already played it first time around -- another break with 
tradition, according to which pictures usually played different venues on roadshow 
and general release -- was heralded by a duplicate premiere in Atlanta on the 
anniversary of its first public performance and a four-week return engagement at 
the New York Capitol, with the top ticket price now $1.25. Nationally, admission 
prices were estimated to be around half those charged for the first release (i.e., an 
average 55 cents top) and MGM now booked Gone with the Wind on 50 per cent 
rental terms: still a hefty percentage, larger than normal even for a premium 
release. Unusually for the general distribution of a very lengthy attraction, the film 
was not shortened but remained intact at its full original running time.19 Earnings 
from the pop-price engagements were expected to top $4,000,000; Ronald Haver 
claimed that they reached $9,700,000, with the total combined gross for both 
domestic releases coming in at around $20 million, twice the previous highest 
world rental (for Ben-Hur) to date. The rest of the world -- or what was accessible 
of it -- contributed an additional $5 million to $10 million.20 
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Overseas, MGM had pursued an identical distribution policy but met with stiffer 
resistance in territories blighted by wartime restrictions. In Britain and the 
Dominions (Australia, Canada and South Africa), exhibitors’ bodies and trade 
authorities strongly opposed the imposition of higher ticket prices and higher rental 
terms. The British Cinematograph Exhibitors’ Association (CEA) called for a 
boycott, citing both its members’ parlous financial position and the resentment 
advanced prices might cause among regular patrons. The technicians’ union 
NATKE demanded a pay rise for its projectionist members if admission charges to 
the film were increased, and its general secretary, Tom O’Brien, advocated a 
government ban. The dispute caused such controversy that questions were raised 
in Parliament over the matter. The three large national circuits’ refusal to book it at 
anything more than a 50 per cent rentals basis led to Gone with the Wind being 
offered to independent exhibitors and smaller chains, which were grateful for the 
opportunity. Even so, only thirteen engagements took place outside London in 
1940 and wider release did not follow until 1942, when controversy continued to 
rage over steep percentage terms and ticket prices. Only on reissue in 1944 were 
admission prices reduced unilaterally, though they still remained higher than 
normal.21 
    Gone with the Wind’s success can be gauged not just by its own epoch-making 
box-office figures but also by the extent to which later pictures took both the film 
and its marketing methods as their model. Having already sold the period costume 
drama All This, and Heaven Too (1940) as part of its 1939--40 program, Warner 
Bros. was not able to insist on special pricing arrangements, but it nonetheless 
encouraged exhibitors “to play the film … in the manner that ‘Gone’ was 
exhibited.” Evening tickets were recommended to be scaled from 75 cents to 
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$1.10 and all showings restricted to single-feature bills; separate performances 
and reserved seats were not required except for the roadshow premiere 
engagement at Los Angeles’ Carthay Circle.22 Charles Chaplin’s political satire 
The Great Dictator (1940) was distributed by United Artists in a pattern which 
exactly duplicated that of Gone with the Wind: 70 per cent rental terms with a 10 
per cent profit guarantee, fixed minimum admission prices, and reserved seats 
only when two theaters played the film concurrently. Even the venues chosen for 
its Broadway launch were the same as those for Gone with the Wind, the Astor 
and the Capitol.23 RKO’s release of Orson Welles’ Citizen Kane (1941) was 
planned for the same policy but, because of the press campaign launched against 
it by newspaper tycoon William Randolph Hearst (on whom the film’s story was 
allegedly based) and the consequent reluctance of many theater chains to play it, 
the film received only a limited number of bookings. After several months’ delay in 
opening the picture, a dual Broadway run was dropped in favor of a single 
roadshow engagement at the RKO Palace, usually a second-run house. But in Los 
Angeles Kane opened simultaneously on a reserved-seat basis at El Capitan, a 
legitimate theater opposite Grauman’s Chinese on Hollywood Boulevard (this was 
its first film presentation), and on grind at the RKO Hillside (where it ran only a 
single week). Other roadshows were played in San Francisco, Boston, Seattle, 
and Philadelphia.24 
    None of these films was successful when played at advanced admissions. The 
Great Dictator opened strongly but drew criticism that Chaplin had turned against 
his regular fans by his insistence on high admission scales.25 Contrary to its 
reputation as a flop, Citizen Kane performed extremely well at regular prices in 
many of those theaters that played it, but due to the Hearst campaign the film 
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received “only about 35 or 40% of normal bookings.”26 As a roadshow, however, it 
was described as “one of the season’s worst.”27 Variety reported the sage wisdom 
of the trade, that “Orson Welles is good, but he isn’t Rhett Butler.”28 
    Two particular aspects of what we might call the Gone with the Wind pattern 
continued to be incorporated into the industry on a longer-term basis. The practice 
of opening a major film in two theaters simultaneously, one on a reserved-seat 
basis, the other on grind (with the former always charging higher prices), was 
revived throughout the next decade with Paramount’s For Whom The Bell Tolls 
(1943), Fox’s The Song of Bernadette (1943) and Gentleman’s Agreement (1947), 
RKO’s Joan of Arc (1948), MGM’s Quo Vadis (1951), Warners’ The Miracle of Our 
Lady of Fatima (1952), and United Artists’ The North Star (1943), G.I. Joe (1945), 
Carnegie Hall (1947), and Limelight (1952). Usually this occurred in only one or 
two key cities, normally New York and Los Angeles. In almost every case the grind 
run outlasted the roadshow engagement, though industry precedent suggested 
that the opposite should have been the case (round-the-clock performances using 
up patrons more rapidly than twice-daily shows). In several cases where the grind 
engagement closed first, the roadshow house subsequently switched policy to one 
of continuous shows at lower prices. All these suggested that the traditional 
roadshow as it had previously been known had outlived its usefulness; indeed its 
obsolescence was already apparent by the late 1930s. The above-named films 
were virtually the only traditional roadshows throughout this period (and limited, we 
repeat, to one or two key cities). The exceptions to this rule applied to a quite 
different type of picture than the big-budget, mass-market entertainments listed 
here and did not begin to appear until after the end of the war.29 
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    A far more pervasive practice, for which Gone with the Wind was again largely 
responsible, was the selective raising of ticket prices for films exhibited on a grind 
basis. Though Selznick’s picture was not the first to be presented in this way -- it 
was anticipated by, for example, Les Miserables (1935), Anthony Adverse (1936), 
The Gorgeous Hussy (1936), Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs (1937), and The 
Goldwyn Follies (1938), albeit on a limited scale -- it was followed by such a large 
number of films adopting the advanced-price policy that its influence can scarcely 
be in doubt. In 1940 alone, they included Arizona, Bitter Sweet, Boom Town, 
Brigham Young, Escape, Foreign Correspondent, New Moon, North West 
Mounted Police, Northwest Passage, The Philadelphia Story, Pinocchio, and 
Strike Up the Band.30 There was considerable debate in the industry over the 
wisdom or otherwise of raising ticket prices for particular pictures without full-scale 
roadshowing. On the one hand, it was believed that the public might accept it if the 
films themselves were seen to merit the additional expense. Several of the afore-
mentioned cases were “justified” by their high production costs, or by the high 
demand for the pictures concerned, or their prestige status. On the other hand, if 
advanced prices were seen as arbitrary and undeserved, audiences might very 
well turn away at the box-office, or express their resentment with fewer 
subsequent theater visits. They might even become sceptical about “ordinary” 
pictures whose prices were not raised, and which might therefore be bypassed as 
inferior attractions.31 The Women’s Institute of Audience Reactions conducted a 
survey of female attitudes towards advanced prices, whose findings were 
published early in 1941. Although 92.9 per cent of those polled preferred a fixed 
regular price for “the average program,” 63.2 per cent said they would be willing to 
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pay a higher price “to see pictures similar to ‘Gone With the Wind.’” However, only 
14.1 per cent were willing to pay extra for reserved seats.32  
    All of this failed to disguise the fact that the major distributors successfully 
asked exhibitors to increase prices because, in what was rapidly becoming a 
booming seller’s market, they could get away with it. From this point on, 
“roadshowing” came to mean little more than pre-release runs at advanced prices, 
usually with continuous performances and often in day-and-date bookings in 
multiple situations. With the exceptions noted above and those still to be 
discussed, from the late 1930s onwards the traditional roadshow policies of a 
single exclusive engagement per city or territory, advance booking of reserved 
seats, and twice-daily separate performances were increasingly marginalized or 
eliminated altogether. 
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Notes 
                                                          
1
 Kine. Weekly, 13 June 1940, p. 5. 
2
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